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This paper investigates empirically how unemployment-induced employment-breaks at 
different career stages influence pension benefits. The analysis is based on German data. I 
distinguish four different career phases and investigate to what extent the prevailing social 
security policy compensated for earning losses. The results suggest that (1) losses in pension 
benefits were the greatest if unemployment occurred in the middle of a career (between 31 
50); (2) social security policies have had a mitigating effect on losses in pension benefits. 
These findings indicate that institutions have a decided influence on how career patterns 
translate into pension benefits.  
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1. Introduction 
Individual employment histories determine the level of pensions people receive when they 
reach retirment age. The higher a worker’s individual earnings and the more continuous his 
career, the higher the pension benefits will be if contributions are closely linked to benefits. In 
other words, employment-breaks due to, for example, unemployment will reduce future 
earnings and pension benefits. These losses in pension benefits can be expected to depend on 
when the employment-break occurs because the on-the-job accumulation of human capital 
varies over the employment career. Social security policies are, of course, explicitly designed 
to mitigate unforseen losses but they can only insure against income losses not against 
foregone accumulation of human capital. 
Information on the influence of employment-breaks on pension benefits is important 
because social security policies have significant distributional effects. In the course of 
demographic change intra- and intergenerational redistribution effects of public pension 
systems often necessitate the old-age coverage to be redefined.
1 Some scholars have indeed 
investigated the influence of employment-breaks on pension benefits in Germany (e.g., 
Wunder 2005) and have shown that unemployment-induced employment-breaks give rise to 
negative long-run effects. I am however not aware of any study that analyzes the influence of 
employment-breaks on pension benefits giving due consideration to the career-state at which 
the break occurred. Mitigating social security policy measures have also not been taken into 
account in the relevant literature so far. Unemployment-induced losses in pension benefits 
may however not only differ because of foregone accumulation of human capital but also 
because of to what extent the prevailing social security policy compenstated for earning 
losses. In fact, employment offices provide contributions to the pension insurance during 
unemployment-induced employment-breaks. In Germany, the amount of contributions the 
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 See, for example, Fehr and Habermann (2006), Breyer and Kifmann (2002), Börsch-Supan et al. (2008) and 
Fehr et al. (2011) on reforms of the German pension system. Various studies investigate income redistribution in 
public pension systems (see, for example, Hupfeld 2009 and 2011 for Germany).   3
Federal Employment Office made differed over time; for example, unemployment-induced 
employment-breaks were credited more generously after 1978.
2 It is the objective of this 
study to analyze the points of times at which unemployment hits the worker and the role of 
social security policies in this context. 
In this paper, I use the biographical dataset from the German Pension Insurance (SUF 
VVL 2004) in order to investigate empirically (1) how unemployment-induced employment-
breaks influence Earning Points of West German men giving due consideration to the career-
state at which the break occurred and (2) how social security policy mitigated the resulting 
pension losses. The dataset contains detailed information on pension benefits and individual 
employment histories. The SUF VVL 2004 is the first dataset covering both of these sets of 
information.
3 My study takes advantage of the interaction between individual employment-
breaks and the social security policy which was pursued at the time of this break. The results 
suggest that (1) losses in pension benefits were the greatest if unemployment occurred in the 
middle of a career (between 31 and 50); (2) social security policies have had a mitigating 
effect on losses in pension benefits. These findings indicate that institutions have a decided 
influence on how career patterns translate into pension benefits.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical aspects and related 
empirical literature on the influence of employment-breaks on wages and pension benefits. 
Section 3 portrays the German pension rules. Section 4 presents the data and specifies the 
empirical model. Section 5 reports and discusses the estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
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 The generosity of the social securtity system and unemployment insurance may also influence retirement 
transitions. See, for example, Coile and Levine (2007) for a study on the United States. 
3
 In the meantime the dataset “Versichertenkontenstichprobe 2005/2006” has been published that contains 
similar information.   4
2. The influence of employment-breaks on wages and pension benefits: 
theoretical background and related empirical evidence 
2.1 Theoertical background 
The differences in pension benefits due to personal events in the individual life cycle are 
determined by several factors. The theory of human capital accumulation provides the most 
useful theoretical background. Human capital is a means of production, and additional 
investment (via education, training etc.) will yield additional output (Becker 1964). The life-
cycle growth of earnings reflects the rate of accumulation of personal investments.
4 In total, 
wages increase over the working life.  
Human capital depreciation due to career interruptions is likely to cause lower 
earnings (e.g., Mincer and Polachek 1974): according to the theory of human capital 
depreciation, lengthy employment-breaks decrease wages at the probability of re-entry to the 
labor market because individuals were unable to keep up with technological progress which, 
in turn may be demotivating. As a result of human capital depreciation, post-interruption 
wages are initially quite low but increase rapidly when the individual continues working. 
Gradually, the human capital that depreciated during the employment-break is restored. 
Mincer and Ofek (1982) describe the restoration effect that alleviates income losses: as can be 
expected, its positive impact depends on the particular phase of life under consideration 
because skills, knowledge, and experience change over the career. Career interruptions are 
therefore valued differently on the labor market, which in turn affects individual income 
differently. While the restoration effect appears to be stronger in the early and middle phases 
of life than in the later employment phase of life, the direct losses of human capital 
depreciation appear greater in the late employment phase of life. For this reason the 
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 Mincer’s (1974) famous “human capital earnings function” relates the natural logarithm of income to the 
number of years of education and experience. Mincer (1993) portrays his previous studies on human capital.   5
interaction between the negative direct human capital depreciation effect and the positive 
restoration effect remains an open empirical question.  
Human capital depreciation and earning losses concern pension benefits directly 
because they interact with earnings and thereby with individual qualifications during the 
employment period.
5 Contributions to the social security system and benefits are closely 
linked in countries with a so called Bismarckian social security system such as in Germany. In 
section 3, I portray the German pension rules in detail. 
When a worker experiences an employment break, three effects influence her/his 
pension benefits. First, the worker experiences a period of lost wages and lost direct 
contributions to the social security system. To be sure, the social security system may 
compensate the missing contributions (in part or in full). This is however a matter of social 
security policy. Second, the worker may suffer a loss of experience and human capital which 
may reduce her/his wages at the subsequent job(s). Third, the worker may respond to the lost 
wages by working more hours or retire later. I will first investigate how these combined 
effects influence pension benefits and then disentangle these combined effects from 
mitigating social policy effects. 
 
2.2 Empirical evidence for Germany 
Empirical studies suggest that employment-breaks cause income losses in Germany. Licht and 
Steiner (1992) use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) in the period 1984-
1989 and find persistent losses in income directly after an employment-break, as well as an 
indirect effect due to the lack of human capital accumulation. Income increases, however, 
after reemployment (restoration effect), which somewhat compensates for the aforementioned 
negative effects. Using a dataset from the German social security system (IAB employment 
sample), Beblo and Wolf (2002) examine the wage effects of different types of career 
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 On retirement savings decisions over the life-cycle see, for example, Lachance (2011).   6
interruptions. The results suggest that for both men and women, early job experiences 
contribute less to current income than recent experiences gained from employment.
6  
Previous research has also shown that unemployment-induced employement-breaks 
decrease pension benefits of West German men: Wunder (2005) analyzes the influence of 
unemployment on pension benefits for different age cohorts, but does not give consideration 
to the career-state at which the break occurred. He uses data from the GSOEP. His results 
show that, especially for short employment histories, the effect of the depreciation in human 
capital is stronger than the negative income effect of lower contributions to the social security 
system. Unemployment of workers belonging to younger cohorts tends to have a stronger 
negative influence on pension benefits than unemployment of workers belonging to older 
cohorts. This research thus indicates that the point of time at which unemployment hits the 
worker influences pension benefits. Yet previous research did not explicitly investigate the 
influence of the point of time at which unemployment hits the worker on pension benefits in 
Germany, which I will do in this paper.
7 The first hypothesis to be investigated is: 
 
H1: unemployment-induced employment-breaks in the early and middle phase of a 
career have a stronger negative influence on pension benefits than unemployment-induced 
employment-breaks in the last phase of a career. 
 
                                                 
6
 Kunze (2002) uses IAB data as well, and finds that the influence of not working depends on the type of 
interruption. A related strand of literature investigates the influence of employment breaks because of parental 
leave on wages and employment behavior. See, for example, Beblo et al. (2009), Görlich and De Grip (2009), 
Geyer and Steiner (2007). 
7
 The association between pension benefits and individual employment histories in Germany was first examined 
in a survey study called AVID`96 (Altersvorsorge in Deutschland). See Schatz et al. (2002) for a more detailed 
description of the AVID’96 and Frommert et al. (2008) on the updated AVID’ 2005. In contrast to the present 
study, the AVID`96 focused on pension benefits in monetary units. For descriptive evaluations employing the 
AVID`96 see, for example, Kortmann and Schatz (1999), Roth (2000), Bieber and Stegmann (2000), Hauschild 
(2002), Steiner (2003), Himmelreicher and Frommert (2006).    7
The theory of human capital accumulation and the related empirical studies do not 
consider the institutional framework.
8 In fact, labor market policies such as training programs 
or unemployment insurance are designed to mitigate human capital depreciation and earning 
losses when individuals are unemployed. Social security policies that provide benefits during 
career interruptions are designed to compenstate for missing contributions when individuals 
have reached old-age. In Germany, for example, the government provides benefits during 
career interruptions due to unemployment, parental leave, studying or military service. 
Consequently, studies examining the effects of human capital depreciation on pension 
benefits should take into account social security policies. The second hypothesis to be 
investigated is: 
 
H2: the more generous the government´s benefits to compensate the losses due to 
unemployment-induced employment breaks, the smaller are the negative direct earning losses 
and human capital depreciation effects on pension benefits.  
 
3. German pension rules 
Social security policy is designed to mitigate losses due to employment-breaks. How 
unemployment influences pension benefits is thus also a matter of institutional rules. In the 
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 Geyer and Steiner (2010) investigate the influence of changing employment patterns and pension reforms on 
the future level of public pensions across birth cohorts in Germany. In a similar vein, Bucheli et al. (2010) 
provide evidence for Uruguay. 
9 Some scholars criticize this formula. The linkage between individual contributions and benefits, for example, 
appears to neglect the fact that life expectancy is positively correlated with income (Breyer and Kifmann 2004). 
Breyer and Hupfeld (2009) have proposed a new concept of “distributive neutrality” that considers income-
group-specific differences in life-expectancy. 
 
   8
Pensionit = Earning Pointsi × Pension Type Factori × Entry Factori × Current Pension Valuet  
 
The Current Pension Value (Aktueller Rentenwert) is fixed for all pensioners in 
(former) East and West-Germany (since July 1, 2009 the Current Pension Value is 27.20 Euro 
in former West Germany and 24.13 Euro in former East Germany) and relates to the product 
of the net replacement rate and the so-called adjusted gross earnings. By taking into account 
demographic changes the Current Pension Value is an important link between 
intergenerational redisbribution and demography. 
The Entry Factor is equal to one if the age at retirement equals the statuary retirement 
age and is lower for early retirement. The Pension Type Factor describes the pension type 
such as old-age pensions, disability pensions or survivor pensions and only differs from one 
for survivor-pensions and some disability pensions. 
The Earning Points (Entgeltpunkte) correspond to the ratio of a worker’s contributable 
income to the mean contributable income of all workers of the same year. For each pensioner 
cohort, the Earning Points link the individual contributions to the benefits (Teilhabe-
Äquivalenz). The Earning Points thus define how general income changes over time are 
distributed in an individual generation in the German public pension system. Moreover, 
employment-breaks due, for example, to unemployment are also accounted for in the Earning 
Points. How unemployment has been accounted for depends on the policy which was 
effective at the time of the unemployment spell. See Lühning (2006), for example, for an 
encompassing portrait of the changes in the German social security system’s benefit 
legislation that have been implemented between 1957 and 2004.  
Until 1978, the Federal Employment Office did not make contributions to the social 
security system in case of career interruptions due to unemployment. Phases of 
unemployment were credited only in the final assessment of the entire (potential) working life 
(period from the age of 17 to the start of the pension). From 1979 to 1991, the Federal   9
Employment Office made contributions to the social security system in case of career 
interruptions due to unemployment. The social security policy designed to mitigate losses due 
to unemployment became more generous after 1978 (especially for low-income workers who 
clearly risked unemployment because contributions were then also based on unemployment 
benefits and not only on past income).
10 The year 1992 constituted a turning point: from then 
on, the Federal Employment Office made (compulsory) contributions to the social security 
system in almost all cases.
11  
 
4. Data and empirical model 
4.1 The data set – SUF VVL 2004 
The data analyzed is the Scientific Use File (SUF) “FDZ-Biografiedatensatz für die 
Biografiedaten zu Vollendeten Versichertenleben (VVL) 2004”, provided by the German 
Pension Insurance. The VVL 2004 is a 20% sample of all retirement entries in 2004 aged 30 
to 65. The SUF represents a 25 % subsample out of the 20% sample of all retirement entries 
in 2004 aged 30 to 65 and only contains cases of new entrants and no transmutations. The 
data refers to pensions deriving from own contributions and therefore do not include widow’s 
pensions etc. The SUF is unfortunately not representative for the entire pensioner population 
in Germany in 2004, as it only covers the inflow and not the stock.
12  
In comparison to the GSOEP the SUF does however not suffer from panel mortality. 
The GSOEP provides survey data, whereas the SUF contains administrative data. In 
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 To be sure, individuals that became only temporarily unemployed for some months after leaving university 
and then never became unemployed the new statute was not favorable. These individuals are execptions 
however. 
11
 This categorization somewhat simplifies the amendments. From July 1978 to the end of 1982, the Federal 
Employment Office made contributions to the public pension scheme on the basis of gross labor income, which 
constituted the claim for unemployment benefits. From 1983 to the end of 1991, the Federal Employment Office 
made contributions on the basis of the unemployment benefits granted. There was an interim arrangement from 
1992 to 1997, under which periods of unemployment were also considered in the final assessment. From 1998 
on, contributions were made on the basis of 80% of gross labor income, which constituted the claim for 
unemployment benefits. 
12
 See Stegmann (2006a), for example, for an encompassing portrait of the preparation and the set-up of this 
dataset and Stegmann (2006b) and Fachinger and Himmelreicher (2006) for a comparison of the properties of 
the SUF VVL 2004 with other already existing databases.   10
comparison to the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) employment sample which has 
so far been the most comprehensive data set covering biographical information, the SUF 
contains wide-ranging information about the individual employment histories. The IAB 
employment sample only goes back to 1975, whereas the SUF 2004 goes back to 1953. 
The SUF reports individual facts such as pension amounts, pension types, and above 
all the Earning Points that measure the individual claim to pension benefits. The Earning 
Points allow estimating the relative earnings position of individuals. This is a significant 
advantage compared to other datasets that refer, for example, to the monthly pension amount 
which is dependent on the real wage. I will use the logarithm of the Earning Points as the 
dependent variable in my empirical model (see Section 4.2).  
The SUF contains information about the individual social earning situation over time, 
including characteristics such as unemployment. The observation period covers 624 months—
from January 1953 to December 2004. The oldest individuals included are born in 1939 and 
the youngest ones in 1974. As I will focus on the working period up to the age of 56, I only 
include individuals born in the interval between 1939 and 1947. Hence in 2004, the youngest 
individuals were 57 and the oldest 65 years old.
13  
The dataset also contains information on other socio-demographic characteristics such 
as marital status, citizenship, and education.
14 The empirical model can therefore fall back on 
variables which are all taken from the SUF. 
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 The sample contains some missings - also within individual careers. The interpretation of the missings is 
significant because a missing value means that the respective month was not relevant from the perspective of 
social security law, but it does not affect pension benefits in any way. Hence one can circumscribe the periods 
for which information is available from all the other states. For example, the only relevant periods of 
unemployment (from a social security law perspective) are the ones coded as unemployed. The relevant periods 
of unemployment can be distinguished from all the other states. Using a variable on the social-economic 
situation ensures that there is no overlapping of potentially parallel employment breaks relevant from a social 
security law perspective. However, the variable on the social-economic situation is coded hierarchically. 
Consequently, periods of parental leave that occurred parallel to full-time employment are not considered: in this 
case, full-time employment takes priority. 
14 The classification of the education status is based on a mechanical reporting system which employers provide 
to the German Pension Insurance (Tätigkeitsschlüssel nach DEÜV). The pensioners report however their socio-
demographic characteristics such as sex, marital status and nationality themselves. Further information on, for 
example, personal traits are not available which in turn are also likely to influence employment duration (e.g. 
Uysal and Pohlmeier 2011).   11
The analysis included pensioners living in West Germany (Berlin is also excluded) 
because East Germans’ careers differed due to the economic and political system in the 
former German Democratic Republic. The dataset also allows identifying individuals who 
lived in the western part of Germany in 2004 but actually have spent their working life in the 
East. I only include individuals in the sample that spent their entire working lifes in West 
Germany and also restrict my conclusions to persons covered by the compulsory German 
social security system.
15 Following Wunder (2005), I focus on men. 
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of the Earning Points in relation to the period of 
registry in the German pension insurance system. Disregarding the period of coverage men’s 
Earning Points on average add up to 52.13. The sum of the Earning Points, however, does 
not increase strictly with longer periods of coverage. Men registered with the German pension 
insurance system for at least 40 years received 57.20 Earning Points on average. The numbers 
presented refer to the final sub-samples. Table 1 also shows that the large majority of the 
individuals in the sample were registered between 45 and 49 years. In the base-line 
specification I will consider an affiliation time of at least 25 years. For robustness checks I 
will compare the results with a longer affiliation of at least 40 years. These two benchmarks 
take into account the respective sample sizes and distributional properties. 
 
4.2 The empirical model 
4.2.1 Estimation approach 
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 As the dataset contains information on the months accounted for in the social security system such as 
employment time and different periods of allowances (e.g., periods of self-employment are not taken into 
account), I can distinguish between different specifications in relation to the period of registry in the German 
pension insurance system.   12
log Earning Pointsi =  ∑j αj Employment-Breaksij + ∑m δm X im+ ui                      (1) 
with j=1,…,4; m=1,…,8                                                                                             
 
The dependent variable “log Earning Pointsi” describes the logarithm of the Earning Points 
of individual i. I take the logarithm of the Earning Points in order to interpret the influence of 
the independent variables on the Earning Points as changes in percentages. “Employment-
Breaksij” models the career interruptions. In the next paragraph I explain their coding in 
detail. The term “Xim” contains a constant term and eight explanatory dummy variables for 
control purposes: family status (married), citizenship (german) and education, where I 
distinguish between Lower School (Hauptschule), Secondary School (Realschule), High 
School Diploma (Abitur) with professional training, High School Diploma (Abitur) without 
professional training, Advanced Technical College Degree, University Degree and unknown 
education.
16 To avoid pefect collinearity between the education dummies, one of the 
education dummies must function as the reference category (here unknown education). The 
estimated effects of the other education dummies then must be interpreted as deviations from 
the reference category.  
 
The linear regression model that investigates hypothesis 1 together with hypothesis 2 has the 
following form: 
 
log Earning Pointsi =  ∑j αj Employment-Breaksij + ∑k βk Social Security Policy Periodik +  
∑l γl Employment-Breaksij * Social Security Policy Periodik + ∑m δm  X im+ ui                      (2) 
with j=1,…,4; k=1;…;3; l=1, 2; m=1,…,8                                                                                             
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 The characteristic „unknown education“ is not a missing value. It is likely that the education of these 
individuals is quite low. In some cases, however, education might just be unknown because employers did not 
ask for this information.    13
The model described in equation (2) is similar to the model in equation (1). I now also include 
the “Social Security Policy Periodik” dummy variables that control for revisions of a statute. I 
illustrate my categorization and the respective modelling below (following the main 
amendments as described in Section 3). “Employment-Breakij * Social Security Policy 
Periodik” describes interaction terms. I consider these interaction terms because the number of 
Earning Points is likely to depend on the policy which prevailed when the individual was 
unemployed. I estimate the models with ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard 
errors. 
 
4.2.2 Employment-break variables 
The choice of the employment-break variables is similar to the work history model first 
introduced by Light and Ureta (1995) and extended, e.g., by Beblo und Wolf (2002). First I 
distinguish between four different phases during the entire employment period with respect to 
the individuals’ career ages: the earliest employment phase extends from 21 to 30; the next 
two intervals extend from 31 to 40 and 41 to 50. The last phase extends from 51 to 60 for the 
age cohorts 1939 to 1943, from 51 to 59 for the age cohort 1944, from 51 to 58 for the age 
cohort 1945, from 51 to 57 for the age cohort 1946 and from 51 to 56 for the age cohort 1947. 
For simplicity I refer to the last phase as the phase of life 51-60. I compute phase-specific 
unemployment shares, i.e., I sum up the individual number of months an individual has been 
unemployed in the respective phase and relate this number to 120 months in the first three 
phases of life, and 120, 108, 96, 84 and 72 months respectively in the last earning phase. For 
robustness checks I will also consider only pensioners who did not retire before the age 60. 
Table 2 shows the means of the employment-break variables conditional on when the 
career interruption occurred, their numerical frequency of the breaks and the means of the 
Earning Points. As expected, unemployed men received fewer Earning Points than employed 
men. However, there are differences between the individual employment phases of life. The   14
difference between Earning Points is highest in the phase of life 41-50 (45.44 to 56.12). It is 
lower in the late phase of life 51-60 (51.61 to 55.54). Differences in mean Earning Points 
among those employed versus unemployed could reflect a selection problem. I therefore 
checked the distribution of the oberservable socio-demographic characteristics such as marital 
status, citizenship, and education of employed versus unemployed men. T-tests on sample 
means show that men who were unemployed had somewhat lower education and were 
somewhat less likely to be married. I control for education and marital status in the 
econometric model. To be sure, I acknowledge that I cannot completely eliminate the concern 
that the two groups might differ on unobservables. 
The number of unemployed men was much larger in the last phase of life (997) than in 
the 41-50 (608), 31-40 (594) and 21-30 phases of life (283). The duration of unemployment 
was much larger in the last employment phase of life (the mean share of unemployment in the 
phase of life 51-60 is 0.21). Correlation between the individual phases of unemployment is 
very low. This means, for example, that unemployment in the middle phases of life did not 
make unemployment in the last phase of life more likely. The numbers presented refer to 
periods of at least 25 years. I normalize (mean zero, variance one) the unemployment share 
variables in order to consider the different distributional properties of the variables and to be 
able to compare the numerical meaning of the coefficients in the econometric model directly. 
 
4.2.3 Policy period variables  
I distinguish between policy sub-periods defined by the main amendments as described in 
Section 3. The respective dummy variables take on the value of one when an individual´s 
career was interrupted in this period and zero otherwise. I consider three different policy sub-
periods regarding the amendments of unemployment: pre-1978, 1979-1991, and post-1992.  
The years, in which policy changes became effective, were coded accordingly. For 
example, when a law changed in May (first half of the year), I consider the entire year as   15
affected by this statute. Changes in the second half of the year are taken into account the 
following year. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the variables included. 
 
4.2.4 Interaction Terms 
I control for the effect that employment-breaks occurred in different policy periods. The first 
amendment dealing with unemployment occurred in 1978, and hence, all the individuals born 
between 1939 and 1947 were affected by the first policy period in their early phase of life 
(age 21–30). Therefore, the interaction term between the first phase of working life and the 
dummy referring to the first policy period is not different from the employment-break 
variable itself. In contrast, there are differences for the middle phases of life 31-40 and 41-50. 
Older individuals, e.g., those born in 1939, experienced the first years of their phase of life 
31-40 under the first policy regime up to 1978. But younger individuals, e.g., those born in 
1947, experienced nearly their entire phase of life 31-40 in the second policy period 1979-
1991. Hence I control for the interaction of unemployment in the phase of life 31-40 with the 
period after the first amendment of 1978. I expect a positive influence of this interaction term 
on the log Earning Points because social polices became more generous after 1978. The 
setting is similar for the phase of life 41-50. Individuals, e.g. those born in 1939, spent their 
phase of life 41-50 in the policy period 1979-1991. In contrast, younger pensioners, e.g., those 
born in 1947, experienced several years of their phase of life 41-50 after the last amendment 
of 1992. Therefore, I include the interaction term of unemployment in the phase of life 41-50 
with the third policy period and again expect a posivite influence of this interaction term on 
the log Earning Points. All pensioners experienced their phase of life 51-60 after the last 
amendment of 1992. I thus cannot distinguhish between employment-break effects in the 
phase of life 51-60 for different policy periods. I normalize (mean zero, variance one) the 
unemployment share and the social policy variables before interacting.  
   16
5. Results 
5.1 Basic results 
Table 4 reports the regression results when policy variables are not included. In columns (1) 
and (2) the control variables are excluded to show that the effects of the unemployment share 
variables are not influenced by the inclusion/exclusion of the control variables. The control 
variables in columns (3) and (4) display the expected signs. The dummy variable “family 
status (married)” is statistically significant at the 1% level and indicates that Earning Points 
of married men were about 13% higher than Earning Points of unmarried men. The dummy 
variable “citizenship (German)” is statistically significant at the 1% level and indicates that 
Earning Points of German men were about 23% higher than Earning Points of Non-German 
men. In columns (3) and (4), the education variables “Secondary School (Realschule)”, “High 
School Diploma (Abitur) with professional training”, “High School Diploma (Abitur) without 
professional training”, “Advanced Technical College Degree”, “University Degree” are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level with the expected positive signs. They indicate that 
Earning Points were about 16% to 32% higher for pensioners with the different educational 
degrees compared to pensioners with unknown educational degree. The “Lower School 
(Hauptschule)” variable is statistically significant at the 5% level in column (3) and at the 
10% level in column (4) and has a negative sign. The estimates suggest that pensioners with a 
Lower School (Hauptschule) education had fewer Earning Points (about 4% less) compared 
to pensioners with no educational degree. The reason may be that education at this quite low 
level does basically have no huge influence on job market opportunities and is similar to an 
unknown educational degree. The R-squared ranges from 0.07 in column (1) to 0.22 in 
column (4) which indicates a quite good explanatory power for a micro-econometric model. 
The results reported in Table 4 clearly show that the point of time at which 
unemployment hits the worker influenced pension benefits. Being unemployed at any point 
during working life reduced Earning Points as expected. The variable for unemployment over   17
the entire working life is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) and (3). As the 
unemployment share has been normalized, the coefficient implies that a one-standard-
deviation change in the unemployment share is associated with a 8.7% (6.7%) reduction in 
Earning Points. The results in columns (2) and (4) show that unemployment in the  phases of 
life 31-40 and 41-50 had a greater negative influence on Earning Points than unemployment 
in the phases of life 21-30 and 51-60. A one-standard-deviation change in the unemployment 
share in the phase of life 21-30 reduced Earning Points by about 0.8%, in the unemployment 
share in the phase of life 31-40 by about 4%, in the unemployment share in the phase of life 
41-50 by about 5.2%, and in the unemployment share in the phase of life 51-60 by about 
2.3%.
17 The coefficients of the unemployment share variable 21-30 are statistically significant 
at the 10% level whereas the other unemployment share variables are statistically significant 
at the 1% level in columns (2) and (4). An F-Test that the unemployment share variables 21-
30, 31-40, 41-50 and 51-60 jointly lack statistical significance can be rejected at the 1% level. 
F-Tests also show that the difference of the coefficients of the unemployment variable 21-30 
and the other unemployment share variables and the difference the coefficients of the 
unemployment variable 51-60 and the other unemployment share variables is unequal to zero 
at the 1% level. The coefficients of the unemployment share variables 31-40 and 41-50 do 
however not turn out to be statistically different. 
Table 5 reports the regression results when the unemployment share variables, the 
social policy variables and the interaction terms between the unemployment share variables 
and the social policy variables are included. The influence of the control variables hardly 
differs from the results in Table 4. The unemployment share variables (31-40, 41-50 and 51-
60) are again statistically significant at the 1% level. 
                                                 
17
 It is important to note that the effect of unemployment in the phases of life 31-40 and 41-50 is also larger in 
absolute terms than unemployment in the phases of life 21-30 and 51-60. In absolute terms, the effect of 
unemployment in the phases of life 31-40 and 41-50 is about two times larger than unemployment in the phase 
of life 21-30 and about four times larger than unemployment in the phase of life 51-60. Recall from Table 3 that 
the standard deviations of the unemployment share variables are larger at older ages.    18
The social policy variable for the first period (till 1978) is statistically significant at the 
1% level in column (1) and at the 5% level in column (2) and has a negative sign. The social 
policy variable for the second period (1979-1991) is statistically significant at the 1% level in 
columns (1) and (2) and has a negative sign, whereas the social policy variable for the third 
period does not turn out to be statistically significant. It is important to remind that I only 
include two interaction terms because all pensioners experienced their phase of life 21-30 
before the first amendment of 1978 and all pensioners experienced their phase of life 51-60 
after the last amendment of 1992. The interaction term between the unemployment share 
variable for the phase of life 31-40 and the social policy variable for the second period is 
statistically significant at the 10% level in column (1) and at the 5% level in column (2) and 
has a positive sign. The interaction term between the unemployment share variable for the 
phase of life 41-50 and the social policy variable for the third period lacks statistical 
significance. 
The marginal effects of the unemployment share variables have to be interpreted 
conditionally on the interaction with the social policy variables (see Friedrich 1982). In 
principle, there are two ways to evaluate the marginal effects. I follow Dreher and Gassebener 
(2007) and evaluate the marginal effects at the minimum and at the maximum of the 
interacted variable. Using this method one can distinguish between the influence of being 
unemployed in a particular phase of life when the German government implemented a 
particular social policy. If one chooses to evaluate the marginal effects at the average level of 
the social policy variables, the statistical significance of these average effects corresponds to 
the t-statistics of the unemployment share variable. Table 6 indicates that the marginal effects 
were statistically significant at the 1% and 5 % level under different policy periods.  
The marginal effects presented in Table 6 can be interpreted as follows: a one-
standard-deviation change in the unemployment share in the phase of life 31-40 reduced 
Earning Points by about 4.8%, when unemployment occurred in the social policy period 1 till   19
1978, but only by about 1.6% in the second social policy period after 1978. A one-standard-
deviation change in the unemployment share in the phase of life 41-50 reduced Earning 
Points by about 3.4% when unemployment occurred in the social policy period 2 (1979-1991) 
but only by about 3.1% in the third social policy period after 1992. Social policy therefore 
significantly mitigated the losses from unemployment after 1978. Only weak additional 
effects occurred in the third compared to the second social policy period. 
 
5.2 Robustness tests 
I have checked the robustness of the results in several ways. The sample included also 
pensioners that retired at the ages 56-59. Since the official retirement age has been 60 for 
several years (the de facto retirement age was lower however) I have excluded the individuals 
aged 56-59 because their working lifes might be different from the standard pensioners 
retiring at the ages 61-65. The results are very similar to the results presented in Tables 4 to 6 
and inferences do not change. 
The results in Tables 4 to 6 refer to a period of coverage of at least 25 years. I have 
also investigated coverage periods of at least 40 years. The estimated losses due to 
unemployment over the entire working period are somewhat smaller when coverage was at 
least 40 years: a one-standard-deviation change in the unemployment share over the entire 
working life reduced Earning Points by about 6% on average. The losses in the last 
employment phase of life 51-60 were also somewhat smaller (about 1.4% compared to about 
2.3%). In a similar vein, a one-standard-deviation change in the unemployment share in the 
phase of life 31-40 reduced Earning Points by about 1.8%, when unemployment occurred in 
the social policy period 1 till 1978, and about 1.5% in the second social policy period after 
1978. A one-standard-deviation change in the unemployment share in the phase of life 41-50 
reduced Earning Points by about 2.9%, when unemployment occurred in the social policy   20
period 2 (1979-1991) and by about 1.9% in the third social policy period after 1992.  In any 
event, inferences do not change overall. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The time at which an unemployment-induced employment-break occurs in a worker´s career 
has had an influence on the pension benefits for West German men who retired in 2004. My 
results show that unemployment in between 31 and 50 reduced pension benefits (Earning 
Points) more severely than unemployment spells in the phases of life 21-30 and 51-60. Social 
security policy somewhat compensated for the penalties suffered due to unemployment. 
Social security policy compensation was especially high when unemployment occurred in the 
second policy period 1979-1991. The results should however be interpreted cautiously 
because the data used only covers individuals who retired in 2004.  
The policy conclusions one may want to draw from my study are as follows. 
Advocates of policies which insure against any present and future income losses would claim 
that employment-breaks due to unemployment in the middle phases of life could be given 
more coverage. To be sure, such policies would have significant distributional effects. The 
German public pension system has been introduced as a Bismarckian system which is 
characterized by a close contribution-benefit linkage.
18 Intragenerational redistribution via 
compensation for employment-breaks weakens the close contribution-benefit linkage. 
Intergenerational redistribution is especially offensive when social security policy privileges a 
particular cohort.
19 Advocates of governments that provide incentive-compatible social 
policies would claim that employment-breaks due to unemployment in the middle phases of 
                                                 
18
 See Breyer and Hupfeld (2009) and (2010), and Breyer and Kifmann (2004), for example, for discussions of 
the contribution-benefit linkage in the German pension system. 
19 Fisher and Keuschnigg (2010), for example, illustrate how several pension reform scenarios are geared either 
towards young or old workers or both groups. See Colombino et al. (2011) on labor supply responses to pension 
reforms in Norway. 
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life could be given less coverage. With less coverage individuals are more likely to (1) try 
harder not to be laid off and to (2) overcome periods of unemployment faster. 
A further implication of my study is that theoretical approaches examing the influence 
of human capital accumulation on income should take into account the institutional set-up. 
Considering these institutions might also render macroeconomic labor market studies more 
relevant (e.g., Burdett et al. 2009). So far, the macroeconomic literature has not investigated 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics on the sum of the Earning Points in relation to the period of coverage under 
the German pension insurance system . 
Period of 
coverage in years  N  Mean Earning 
Points 







Overall  4723 52.13      
>=20  4522 54.02  >=20; <=24  70 16.96 
>=25  4445 54.66  >=25; <=29  68 21.55 
>=30  4359 55.03  >=30; <=34  107 29.58 
>=35  4225 56.11  >=35; <=39  171 34.53 
>=40  4006 57.20  >=40; <=44  464 49.17 
>=45  3306 58.47  >=45; <=49  2755 58.14 
>=50  179 62.01      
 
Table 2 
Distribution of the Earning Points and shares in relation to the (Un) employment phases. 
Employment Phase    N  Mean Earning 
Points 
Mean Share of Unemployment 
(Share if  ≠0) 
unemployed  283 49.04  0.056 
Age 21-30 
employed  4126 55.04  0 
unemployed  594 46.68  0.088 
Age 31-40  
employed  3851 55.89  0 
unemployed  608 45.44  0.131 
Age 41-50  
employed  3837 56.12  0 
unemployed  997 51.61  0.210 
Age 51-60 
employed  3448 55.54  0 
unemployed  1741 50.62  0.051  Entire working 
period  employed  2704 57.26  0   26
Table 3. 
Descriptive Statistics. At least 25 years’ coverage under the German pension insurance 
system.  
  Obs.  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Earning Points  4445  54.66  14.23  5.8  87.8 
Unemployment entire period  4445  0.02  0.04  0  0.46 
Unemployment (age 21-30)  4445  0.00  0.02  0  0.41 
Unemployment (age 31-40)  4445  0.01  0.05  0  0.68 
Unemployment (age 41-50)  4445  0.02  0.07  0  0.94 
Unemployment (age 51-60)  4445  0.05  0.12  0  1 
Unemployment Policy Period 1  
(till 1978)  4445 0.14 0.35  0  1 
Unemployment Policy Period 2  
(1979-1991) 4445  0.18  0.38  0  1 
Unemployment Policy Period 3 (since 
1992) 4445  0.23  0.42  0  1 
Family Status (Married)  4445  0.85  0.36  0  1 
Citizenship (German)  4445  0.97  0.18  0  1 
Lower school (Hauptschule)  4445  0.10  0.29  0  1 
Secondary School (Realschule)  4445  0.60  0.49  0  1 
High School Diploma (Abitur) with 
professional training  4445 0.00 0.07  0  1 
High School Diploma (Abitur) without 
professional training  4445 0.02 0.13  0  1 
Advanced Technical College Degree  4445  0.06  0.25  0  1 
University Degree  4445  0.05  0.23  0  1 
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Table 4 
Regression Results. OLS, robust standard errors. At least 25 years’ coverage under the German 
pension insurance system.  
Dependent variable: log Earning Points. 
Only unemployment shares included. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unemployment entire period  -0.0865***  -0.0673***  
  [16.81]  [13.38]  
Unemployment (age 21-30)   -0.0076*  -0.0075* 
   [1.74]  [1.87] 
Unemployment (age 31-40)   -0.0416***  -0.0358*** 
   [7.34]  [6.74] 
Unemployment (age 41-50)   -0.0576***  -0.0455*** 
   [10.00]   [8.55] 
Unemployment (age 51-60)   -0.0270***  -0.0175*** 
   [4.95]  [3.42] 
Family Status (Married)     0.1291***  0.1253*** 
     [10.29]  [10.01] 
Citizenship (German)     0.2340***  0.2280*** 
     [8.87]  [8.67] 
Lower school (Hauptschule)     -0.0430**  -0.0355* 
     [2.17]  [1.79] 
Secondary School (Realschule)     0.1523***  0.1571*** 
     [10.20]  [10.58] 
High School Diploma (Abitur) with 
professional training     0.1608***  0.1628*** 
     [3.79]  [3.81] 
High School Diploma (Abitur) without 
professional training     0.1929***  0.2041*** 
     [2.86]  [3.15] 
Advanced Technical College Degree     0.3219***  0.3240*** 
     [18.44]  [18.64] 
University Degree     0.2491***  0.2515*** 
     [12.57]  [12.67] 
Constant  3.9575*** 3.9575*** 3.4977*** 3.5027*** 
  [856.72] [862.78] [113.60] [113.99] 
Observations  4445 4445 4445 4445 
R-squared  0.07 0.09 0.21 0.22 







   28
Table 5 
Regression Results. OLS, robust standard errors. At least 25 years’ coverage under the German 
pension insurance system.  
Dependent variable: log Earning Points. 
Unemployment shares, policy period dummies and interaction terms included. 
  (1) (2) 
Unemployment (age 21-30)  -0.0012  -0.003 
 [0.26]  [0.72] 
Unemployment (age 31-40)  -0.0424***  -0.0414*** 
 [3.08]  [3.28] 
Unemployment (age 41-50)  -0.0352***  -0.0301*** 
 [5.96]  [5.28] 
Unemployment (age 51-60)  -0.0314***  -0.0207*** 
 [4.03]  [2.81] 
Unemployment Policy Period 1 (till 1978)  -0.0178***  -0.0120** 
 [2.97]  [2.17] 
Unemployment Policy Period 2 (1979-1991)  -0.0560***  -0.0423*** 
 [10.04]  [7.98] 
Unemployment Policy Period 3 (since 1992)  0.0100  0.0063 
 [1.40]  [0.95] 
Unemployment (age 31-40)* 
Unemployment Policy Period 2 (1979-1991)  0.0122* 0.0117** 
 [1.90]  [1.97] 
Unemployment (age 41-50)* 
Unemployment Policy Period 3 (since 1992)  0.0007  0.0017 
 [0.18]  [0.47] 
Family Status (Married)    0.1211*** 
   [9.79] 
Citizenship (German)    0.2227*** 
   [8.56] 
Lower school (Hauptschule)    -0.0424** 
   [2.15] 
Secondary School (Realschule)    0.1484*** 
   [9.94] 
High School Diploma (Abitur) with 
professional training    0.1498*** 
   [3.48] 
High School Diploma (Abitur) without 
professional training    0.1998*** 
   [3.25] 
Advanced Technical College Degree    0.3069*** 
   [17.34] 
University Degree    0.2358*** 
   [11.76] 
Constant 3.9526***  3.5144*** 
 [738.27]  [114.63] 
Observations 4445  4445 
R-squared 0.11  0.24 




Marginal Effects.  
    (1) (2) 




Unemployment (age 31-40) 
Unemployed in Policy Period 2 
(till 1979-1991) 
[2.58] [2.73] 




Unemployment (age 41-50) 
Unemployed in Policy Period 3 
(since 1992) 
[4.36] [3.71] 
 
 
 
 